In Mazza v. Housecraft LLC, No. 09-CV-1068 (D.C. April 28, 2011), the D.C. Court of Appeals held that the recent Supreme Court decisions articulating the requirements that a complaint must meet in order to survive a motion to dismiss, i.e. Ashcrof v. Iqbal and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, apply in the District of Columbia.
In pertinent part, the Court stated:
The Supreme Court has recently articulated two prongs in determining whether acomplaint is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss: whether the complaint includes well pleaded factual allegations as an initial matter, and whether such allegations plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, — U.S. —, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d868 (2009), the Court elaborated on Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct.1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). In Iqbal, the Court noted that as an initial matter, Fed. R.Civ. P. 8 (a) “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations [in a pleading],’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” 129 S.Ct. at1949 (quoting Twombly, supra, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). . . . While only the first prong is relevant to our analysis here, we hold that both requirements apply in our jurisdiction. We have not heretofore expressly adopted both of the requirements articulated in Twombly and Iqbal. . . . However, we take this opportunity to recognize thatTwombly and Iqbal apply in our jurisdiction.
7/5/2011: The D.C. Court of Appeals issued an order dated June 30, 2011, vacating the Mazza opinion, on the grounds that the case had settled and therefore was moot. Therefore, the Mazza opinion is no longer binding precedent in the District. At the same time, the opinion hasn't been "disappeared": it is still available.