Here is a link to an article on Iqbal and Twombly published in the FDCC Quarterly. Interestingly, the District of Columbia is one of seven jurisdictions on the state level that have adopted Twombly. I can't say I have seen much of a difference in the way Superior Court judges handle motions to dismiss.
In a recent case, Duk Hea Oh v. National Capital Revitalization Corporation, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals stated in a footnote that it has not yet definitively decided whether to adopt the standards of Twombly and Iqbal:
Until 2007, the federal standard for pleadings was the one set out in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45 (1957) ("[A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that a plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief"). The Supreme Court has rejected the Conley standard in favor of a higher pleading threshold. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009). In Twombly, an antitrust case, the Supreme Court "retired" the "no set of facts" language in favor of a new "plausibility" standard. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 553. In Iqbal, the Court confirmed that Twombly "governs the pleading standard for all civil actions . . . and proceedings in the United States district courts." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1953 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Iqbal held that in order "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,'" explaining that "[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. at 1949.
Although the Iqbal Court did not explicitly discuss affirmative defense pleadings, many U.S. District Courts have applied this higher standard to all pleadings, whether complaints or affirmative defenses. See, e.g., Castillo v. Roche Laboratories, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87681, at *4-*5 (S.D. Fla. July 30, 2010) (collecting cases and observing that "[w]hile no Circuit Courts of Appeals have addressed whether this heightened pleading standard applies to affirmative defenses, a majority of lower courts have found that it does"). Other courts have explicitly declined to apply the Twombly/Iqbal standard to affirmative defenses. See id. at *6-*7 (collecting cases). This court has not definitively decided whether to adopt that standard for complaints, much less whether to apply the standard to affirmative defenses. . . .
Duk Hea Oh, at fn. 10.